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LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
Thomas M. Winn, 11I*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses six areas of labor and employment law in
which there was significant activity in Virginia's courts over the
past year: (1) covenants not to compete and employee's fiduciary
duties to employers; (2) the doctrine of respondeat superior; (3)
negligent hiring, retention, and supervision; (4) wrongful dis-
charge in violation of public policy; (5) workers' compensation ex-
clusivity; and (6) employment agreements. Beyond the scope of
this article are decisions rendered in other areas of law that affect
the employment relationship, including defamation,' claims un-
der Virginia's Occupational Safety and Health Act,2 public em-
ployment claims,3 and unemployment compensation claims.4
* Principal, Woods, Rogers & Hazlegrove, P.L.C., Roanoke, Virginia. A.B., 1990,
Duke University; J.D., 1993, University of Richmond School of Law, cum laude.
L See, e.g., Larimore v. Blaylock, 259 Va. 568, 528 S.E.2d 119 (2000) (holding that
allegedly defamatory communications between members of Radford University's academic
department, concerning a professor, were subject to "qualified" immunity rather than
"absolute" immunity).
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-1 to -51.4:4 (Repl. Vol. 1999 & Cum. Supp. 2001). See, e.g.,
Halterman v. Radisson Hotel Corp., 259 Va. 171, 523 S.E.2d 823 (2000) (holding that an
employer at a multi-employer worksite was responsible for providing information about its
Hazardous Communications Program to the employer(s) of other employees working at the
same work site, but that the employer was under no duty to provide such information to
his employees).
3. See, e.g., Arlington County v. White, 259 Va. 708, 528 S.E.2d 706 (2000) (affirming
summary judgment for Arlington County taxpayers who claimed that the county lacked
authority to extend insurance coverage to same-sex domestic partners under its self-
funded health benefits plan for county employees and that the Virginia legislature did not
contemplate a definition of"dependent" that did not require some manner of financial de-
pendence, as opposed to "interdependence"); Russell County Dept. of Soc. Servs. v.
O'Quinn, 259 Va. 139, 523 S.E.2d 492 (2000) (holding, in an employee's declaratory judg-
ment action seeking reinstatement of employment, that Virginia's Declaratory Judgment
Act does not authorize an award of attorney's fees).
4. Bistawros v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, No. 2207-00-4, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS
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II. COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE AND THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF
LOYALTY
Perhaps the most significant labor and employment decisions
of the past year arose in the field of covenants not to compete. For
the last fifty years, the Supreme Court of Virginia has shep-
herded the law of noncompetition agreements into a well-defined,
unambiguous framework from which an employer's counsel could
protect their client's businesses and their investment in employ-
ees. Pursuant to the court's decision in Roanoke Engineering
Sales v. Rosenbaum,5 employers must consider whether "re-
straint, from the standpoint of the employer, [is] reasonable in
the sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the
employer in some legitimate business interest[.]"' Subsequent de-
cisions clarified that such reasonableness is achieved by limiting
noncompetition agreements to "businesses similar" to that in
which employers engage.7
Virginia businesses and attorneys using these prior decisions
as a road map to aid in drafting and enforcing noncompetition
agreements, however, will find themselves repeatedly asking for
direction in light of the court's two recent decisions in Simmons v.
Miller' and Motion Control Systems, Inc. v. East.9
In Simmons, without citation to any of the above-referenced
decisions regarding the "business similar" language approved
therein, the Supreme Court of Virginia struck down the very
same "business similar" language for being too general.' ° At issue
in Simmons was a noncompetition agreement that provided:
For a period of three (3) years after this termination or expiration of
77 (Ct. App. Feb. 20, 2001) (unpublished decision) (denying benefits to a former day care
worker who was discharged for making threats related to his suspicions about other staff
practicing witchcraft against him); Duncan v. Data Servs. Am., No. 0431-00-2, 2000 Va.
App. LEXIS 646 (Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2000) (unpublished decision) (denying benefits to an
employee who was fired for sending a defamatory letter accusing the employer of fraud
and for threatening disruptive legal action).
5. 223 Va. 548, 290 S.E.2d 882 (1982).
6. Id. at 552, 290 S.E.2d at 884.
7. See, e.g., Rash v. Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co., 251 Va. 281, 467 S.E.2d 791 (1996);
New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 245 Va. 367, 429 S.E.2d 25 (1993); Blue Ridge
Anesthesia and Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369, 389 S.E.2d 467 (1990).
8. 261Va. 561, 544 S.E.2d 666 (2001).
9. 262 Va. 33, 546 S.E.2d 424 (2001).
10. Simmons, 261 Va. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678.
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
the Agreement, Employee shall not directly or indirectly, own, man-
age, control, be employed by, participate in, or be connected in any
manner with ownership, management, operation, or control of any
business similar to the type of business conducted by Employer at
the time this Agreement terminates.
11
The Simmons court began its analysis of the covenant by recit-
ing the now-familiar tri-partite standard recently echoed in Ad-
vanced Marine Enterprises v. PRC, Inc. 2 In Simmons, the court
held that in order to determine whether a noncompetition agree-
ment may be enforced, a chancellor must consider the following
criteria:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasonable
in the sense that it is no greater than necessary to protect the em-
ployer in some legitimate business interest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasonable
in the sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing
his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound public
policy?
13
The court then noted that such clauses are strictly construed
against the employer because they restrain trade. 4 Furthermore,
the court explained that the employer bears the burden of proving
that the restraint is reasonable under the specific facts of the
case.'5 Finally, the court noted that enforceability of such clauses
is a question of law to be determined by the court. 6
Turning to the facts, the court pointed out that while the em-
ployer was engaged in the import of one particular brand of cigars
grown and manufactured in the Canary Islands, the noncompeti-
tion clause restricted "any business similar to the type of business
conducted by [the employer]" that is "considerably broader" than
1_ Id. at 580, 544 S.E.2d at 678.
12. 256 Va. 106, 501 S.E.2d 148 (1998).
13. Simmons, 261 Va. at 580-81, 544 S.E.2d at 678 (quoting Advanced Marine Enter.,
256 Va. at 118, 501 S.E.2d at 155).
14. Id. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678 (citing Grant v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410, 412 (4th
Cir. 1984)).
15. Id. (citing Blue Ridge Anesthesia and Critical Care, Inc. v. Gidick, 239 Va. 369,
374, 389 S.E.2d 467, 470 (1990)).
16. Id. (citing Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Walker, 251 Ga. 536, 537, 307 S.E.2d 914,
916 (1983)).
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the employer's business.17 It is noteworthy that the court did not
address this issue with any explicit citation or even veiled refer-
ence to its prior line of cases approving "business similar" lan-
guage.'" Regardless, the noncompetition clause at issue was
doomed because the clause was without any geographical limita-
tion, despite the defined geographical parameters of the em-
ployer's business. 9 In the final analysis, the court held:
[UMpon consideration of the lengthy duration of the restriction, the
expansion of restricted finctions, and the lack of any geographical
limitation,... the restrictive covenant was greater than necessary to
protect the legitimate business interests of [the employer], and un-
duly harsh and oppressive in curtailing [the employee's] legitimate
efforts to pursue her livelihood. As an unnecessary and unreasonable
restraint of trade, the non-competition clause is offensive to the pub-
lic policy of the Commonwealth and is not enforceable. 21
In Motion Control Systems, Inc. v. East,22 decided just two
months after Simmons, the Supreme Court of Virginia suggested
that an attempt to make "similar business" language more spe-
cific may render a noncompetition agreement overbroad in some
circumstances. 23 At issue in that case was a clause that provided:
[T]he Employee agrees that for a period of two years after termina-
tion of their employment with the Company in any manner whether
with or without cause, the Employee will not within a one hundred
(100) mile radius of the Company's principal office in Dublin, Vir-
ginia, directly or indirectly, own, manage, operate, control, be em-
ployed by, participate in, or be associated in any manner with the
ownership, management, operation or control of any business similar
to the type of business conducted by the Company at the time of the
termination of this Agreement. The term "business similar to the
type of business conducted by the Company" includes, but is not lim-
ited to any business that designs, manufactures, sells or distributes
motors, motor drives or motor controls.
24
17. Id.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. The court acknowledged prior decisions in which it found restrictive covenants
lasting as long as three years reasonable under the circumstances of the particular case.
Id. (citing Blue Ridge Anesthesia, 239 Va. at 374, 389 S.E.2d at 470; Roanoke Eng'g Sales
v. Rosenbaum, 223 Va. 548, 556, 290 S.E.2d 882, 887 (1982)).
21. Id. at 581, 544 S.E.2d at 678-79.
22. 262 Va. 33, 546 S.E.2d 424(2001).
23. See id. at 37-38, 546 S.E.2d at 425-26.
24. Id. at 36, 546 S.E.2d at 425.
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As in Simmons, the court emphasized the barriers that face
employers seeking to enforce such clauses:
Covenants not to compete are restraints on trade and accordingly are
not favored. The validity of a covenant not to compete is determined
by applying not only the general principles of contract construction,
but also legal principles specifically applicable to such covenants.
The employer bears the burden to show that the restraint is reason-
able and no greater than necessary to protect the employer's legiti-
mate business interests. The restraint may not be unduly harsh or
oppressive in curtailing the employee's legitimate efforts to earn a
livelihood and must be reasonable in light of sound public policy. As
a restraint of trade, the covenant must be strictly construed and, if
ambiguous, it must be construed in favor of the employee.
25
The two-year restriction and the geographic scope of the cove-
nant were not issues considered on appeal.26 Addressing only the
scope of restricted activities, the court declined to enforce the
noncompetition clause because it "prohibits employment in any
business, for example, that sells motors, regardless of whether
the motors are the specialized types of brushless motors sold by
[the employer]."27 The court held that the restrictive language de-
fining "business similar" was inserted into the agreement upon
the suggestion of the employee, and thus, was of no importance.28
Because the court found that the covenant imposed restraints
that exceeded those necessary to protect the legitimate business
interests of the employer, it held the covenant unenforceable.29
In another case of interest, Carilion Healthcare Corp. v. Ball,"
a health care corporation system ("CHC") sought to enjoin one of
its former physicians ("Ball") from competing against it pursuant
to a noncompetition covenant incorporated into the physician em-
ployment agreement ("PEA").3' The noncompetition covenant pro-
vided that Ball would not provide primary care medical services
within twenty-five miles of the primary office for a two-year pe-
riod following any termination of employment.32 The restrictive
25. Id. at 37, 546 S.E.2d at 425-26 (citing Richardson v. Paxton, 203 Va. 790, 794-95,
127 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1962)).
26. See id. at 38, 546 S.E.2d at 426.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. No. CHO0-732, 2001 Va. Cir. LEXIS 22 (Cir. Ct. Feb. 26, 2001) (Roanoke County).
31. Id. at. 1
32. Id. at *3.
2001]
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covenant arose from both the sale of Ball's practice to CHC and
from the employment relationship.33 After the sale was complete,
Ball remained an employee with CHC until the PEA expired, at
which time CHC made him a reasonable offer to continue his em-
ployment.34 Ball declined the offer and began practicing medicine
independent of CHC."5
Ball contended that the covenant was triggered only by termi-
nation of his employment before the end of the term required by
the PEA.36 Ball further argued that since he worked until his
term expired, the covenant was not triggered and he could not
have possibly violated its terms.37 Based on a full reading of the
agreement, the court held that the parties intended the noncom-
petition covenant to survive the expiration of the PEA and that
the covenant is triggered when a reasonable offer to continue em-
ployment is made, rather than when employment is terminated
prematurely. 8
With regard to an employee's fiduciary duty of loyalty in Radon
Control Professionals, Inc. v. Keely,39 the Fairfax Circuit Court
granted an injunction forbidding a former employee from utilizing
any of the techniques or methods that he learned from his former
employer that were not already known in the public domain.4"
This decision underscores the principle clarified by the Supreme
Court of Virginia in Feddeman & Co. v. Langan Assoc.4 In Fed-
deman, the court held that a departed employee owes a continu-
ing fiduciary duty of loyalty, with regard to confidential informa-
tion acquired during the course of employment, to a former
employer even after the termination of the employment relation-
ship.42
33. Id.
34. Id. at *1.
35. Id.
36. Id. at *2.
37. Id.
38. Id. at *13.
39. Ch. No. 168597 (Va. Cir. Ct. filed Sept. 13, 2000) (Fairfax County). This case was
ultimately dismissed. (Va. Cir. Ct. June 12, 2001). See id.
40. See id. (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 6, 2000) (order granting pendente lite injunction).
41. 260 Va. 35, 530 S.E.2d 668 (2000).
42. Id. at 44, 530 S.E.2d at 673.
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III. RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The Supreme Court of Virginia's recent decisions addressing
the scope of respondeat superior likewise captured broad atten-
tion over the past year. Under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior,' an employer is liable for the tortious acts of its employee if
the employee was acting within the scope of his employment
when the tortious acts were committed.' Two years ago, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia issued a decision that has been touted by
some as "set[ting] an outer limit on employer liability."45 In Giant
of Maryland, Inc. v. Enger," the court reversed a jury verdict in
favor of an elderly customer hit by a supermarket clerk.' The
court explained that the test for employer liability is not whether
the tortious act itself is a transaction within the ordinary course
of the employer's business, but whether the service itself, in
which the tortious act was done, is within the ordinary course of
such business.' In the past year, the court decided two cases
which further refine this approach.
First, in Majorana v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp.,49 the
plaintiff alleged that she stopped at the defendant's gas station,
where she was a regular customer.0 When she attempted to pay
for her purchase with a credit card, an employee produced a small
black notebook and refused to complete the transaction unless
she provided him with her telephone number.51 In addition, the
employee told the plaintiff that he told his friends that he was go-
ing to marry her.52 When the plaintiff refused to provide her tele-
phone number, the employee became angry, refused to return her
credit card, and told her to get some sodas and "take a break"
while he attended to other customers.53 Further, the plaintiff al-
leged that after the other customers departed, the employee
43. The phrase respondeat superior is translated as "let the master answer."
44. See Kensington Assocs. v. West, 234 Va. 430, 432, 362 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1987).
45. Deborah Elkins, Employer Was Not Liable for Workplace Assault: Respondeat Su-
perior Being Reined In?, VA. LAW. WKLY, Apr. 26, 1999, at Al.
46. 257 Va. 513, 515 S.E.2d 111 (1999).
47. Id. at 517, 515 S.E.2d at 113.
48. Id. at 516-17, 515 S.E.2d at 112-13.
49. 260 Va. 521, 539 S.E.2d 426 (2000).
50. Id. at 524, 539 S.E.2d at 427.
5L Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
2001]
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moved from behind the counter, lunged at her, attempted to kiss
her, grabbed her breasts, rubbed his body against her, and made
an "animal-like conquering scream."54 Eventually, the employee
completed the transaction, and the plaintiff departed."
The supreme court reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs
claims of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, which had been attributed to the defendant em-
ployer through the doctrine of respondeat superior." The court
held that a plaintiff satisfies the burden of production on the is-
sue of respondeat superior when he establishes the employer-
employee relationship at the time of the alleged tort. 7 A pre-
sumption of employer liability then exists, which shifts the bur-
den of production to the employer.5" The employer must prove
that the employee acted beyond the scope of his employment in
engaging in the alleged conduct.59 Assuming the employer satis-
fies this burden, an issue of fact for the jury results unless the na-
ture of the defendant's proof justifies a ruling from the court as a
matter of law.60
In Gina Chin & Associates v. First Union Bank,6' the plaintiff
alleged that First Union was negligent because it accepted checks
with both forged signatures of the plaintiff and forged endorse-
ments of payees.62 The plaintiff further alleged that the bank was
vicariously liable for the criminal acts of its teller who partici-
pated in the forgery scheme.6 The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the trial court erred by ruling as a matter of law that an
employee bank teller who knowingly accepted forged checks for
deposit was acting outside the scope of his employment.' The
court noted that it has:
consistently held that proof of the employment relationship creates a
prima facie rebuttable presumption of the employer's liability. Thus,
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 526, 539 S.E.2d at 428-29.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 526-27, 539 S.E.2d at 429.
60. Id. at 527, 539 S.E.2d at 429.
61. 260 Va. 533, 537 S.E.2d 573 (2000).
62. Id. at 538, 537 S.E.2d at 575.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 544, 537 S.E.2d at 579.
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"[w]hen an employer-employee relationship has been established,
'the burden is on the [employer] to prove that the [employee] was not
acting within the scope of his employment when he committed the
act complained of, and... if the evidence leaves the question in
doubt it becomes an issue to be determined by the jury.'"
Admittedly, the trial court's task may be particularly difficult in
cases in which the injury is caused by an intentional, often criminal,
tortious act which clearly would not have been contemplated by the
employer as being within the scope of employment, but which none-
theless was performed incident to the employment and even facili-
tated thereby. Such cases invoke consideration of whether the em-
ployee deviated from the scope of his employment because of an
"external, independent, and personal motive.., to do the act upon
his own account." In that regard, we have distinguished between the
motive of the employee and the relevant question whether the ser-
vice performed was within the scope of employment. In making this
distinction, we have held that the motive of the employee in commit-
ting the act complained of is not determinative of whether it took
place within the scope of the employment relationship. Rather, the
issue is "whether the service itself, in which the tortious act was
done, was within the ordinary course of such business."
65
The court acknowledged that when the employee criminally ac-
cepted known forged checks, "he was performing a normal func-
tion of a bank teller in accepting checks for deposit."66 The court
emphasized that the employee's improper motive is not irrelevant
to the inquiry, but "[r]ather, it is merely a factor to be considered
in making that determination, and, unless the deviation from the
employer's business is slight on the one hand, or marked and un-
usual on the other, but falls instead between those two extremes,
the question is for the jury.""
The court concluded that the trial court's decision to strike the
plaintiff's evidence was premised not on the failure of the plaintiff
to present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of
the necessary employment relationship, but on the failure of the
evidence to prove that the acts complained of were committed
within the scope of that employment.6" "[HIlaving established that
the employment relationship existed, [the plaintiff] was entitled
to have the case go forward with the burden on [the bank] to
65. Id. at 542-43, 537 S.E.2d at 577-78 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
66. Id. at 545, 537 S.E.2d at 579.
67. Id. at 543-44, 537 S.E.2d at 578.
68. Id.
2001]
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prove that [its employee] acted outside the scope of his employ-
ment."6 9
IV. NEGLIGENCE IN HIRING, RETENTION, AND SUPERVISION
Tort actions in which the employer is allegedly responsible for
the acts of its employees continue to receive increasing attention
in Virginia courts. Often as an alternative to, or in addition to,
pursuing federal remedies, plaintiffs seek tort remedies for al-
leged wrongs arising out of the employment relationship. Out-
growths of the doctrine of respondeat superior and related claims
of negligence in employment are becoming more commonplace.
Many of these cases were litigated in Virginia courts this past
year.
The tort theory of negligent hiring has been recognized for
some time in Virginia.7" "[N]egligent hiring is a doctrine of pri-
mary liability; the employer is principally liable for negligently
placing an unfit person in an employment situation involving an
unreasonable risk of harm to others."7 As expressed by one cir-
cuit court, a plaintiff must demonstrate:
that an employee had a propensity for the conduct that ultimately
resulted in the injury to others and that knowledge of the propensity
was reasonably discoverable; the employer failed to inquire; and, had
the employer inquired, it would not have placed the employee in the
same position that it did .... [U]nlike the knowledge element for
negligent supervision or retention, the knowledge must occur prior to
the hiring or placement.
72
69. Id. at 545, 537 S.E.2d at 579.
70. See, e.g., Southeastern Apartments Mgmt., Inc. v. Jackman, 257 Va. 256, 513
S.E.2d 395 (1999); Courtney v. Ross Stores, Inc., 45 Va. Cir. 429 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Fairfax
County) (noting that the tort of negligent hiring has a long history in the state, dating
back at least to 1903).
71. J. v. Victory Tabernacle Baptist Church, 236 Va. 206, 211, 372 S.E.2d 391, 394
(1988) (quoting Cindy M. Haerle, Note, Minnesota Developments-Employer Liability for
the Criminal Acts of Employees Under Negligent Hiring Theory: Ponticas v. K.M.S. In-
vests., 68 MINN. L. REV. 1303, 1306-07 (1984)).
72. Courtney, 45 Va. Cir. at 430 (citing Davis v. Merril, 133 Va. 69, 78-81, 112 S.E.
628, 630-32 (1922)); see also Berry v. Scott & Stringfellow, 45 Va. Cir. 240, 248 (Cir. Ct.
1998) (Norfolk City) (summarizing the test for negligent hiring within the scope of sexual
harassment and assault claims).
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By comparison, negligent supervision claims allege that the
employer negligently monitored the offender's activities."3 The
Supreme Court of Virginia has declined to recognize the tort of
negligent supervision and does not impose a duty of reasonable
care upon an employer in the supervision of its employees. 4
A negligent retention claim is distinct from a negligent hiring
or negligent supervision claim. In the negligent retention context,
the employee argues that the employer knew of the offender's
prior bad acts but kept the offender in his position, thereby un-
reasonably exposing others to harm.75 In opining on the tort of
negligent retention, the courts have noted that for liability to be
imposed, the employer must "negligently retain or fail to fire or
remove an employee after learning of the employee's incompe-
tence, negligence, or unfitness for a position."7 6
In Sutphin v. United American Insurance Co.,7 an insurance
agent, who was an independent contractor for the defendant in-
surance company, sued the company for the negligent retention of
a branch manager who allegedly sexually harassed her." The dis-
trict court rejected the plaintiffs claims on the ground that the
manager's alleged conduct was not actionable in its own right. 9
In this regard, the court noted that while Virginia courts have
never directly addressed whether the tort of negligent retention
requires physical harm or injury, case precedent requires, at the
very least, that the alleged conduct give rise to an underlying
73. See Paul Fletcher, Negligent Retention: Your Success May Depend on Whether You
Sue in State or Federal Court, VA. LAW. WKLY., Sept. 29, 1997, at B1.
74. See, e.g., C&P Tel. v. Dowdy, 235 Va. 55, 365 S.E.2d 751 (1988); see also Courtney,
45 Va. Cir. at 432 ("In Virginia there is no duty of reasonable care imposed upon an em-
ployer in the supervision of its employees under these circumstances and we will not cre-
ate one here." (quoting Dowdy, 235 Va. at 61, 365 S.E.2d at 754)).
75. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 73, at B1. Prior to the Supreme Court of Virginia's
decision in Southeastern Apartments Management Inc. v. Jackman, 257 Va. 256, 513 S.E.
2d 395 (1999), courts in Virginia were split on the issue of the viability of the tort of negli-
gent retention. See, e.g., Tremel v. Reid, 45 Va. Cir. 364, 383 (Cir. Ct. 1998) (Albemarle
County) (arguing that because the state recognized negligent hiring as an actionable
claim, logic would dictate that the Commonwealth also recognizes negligent retention).
Some courts were persuaded by this argument, but up to that point there had been little
guidance on the subject from the state's highest court.
76. Courtney, 45 Va. Cir. at 431.
77. No. 7:00CV00669, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21063 (W.D. Va. Dec. 13, 2000).
78. Id. at 1.
79. Id. at *5.
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wrong that is actionable in its own right.8" In Sutphin, the plain-
tiff admitted that the branch manager never physically touched
or assaulted her."' Instead, she merely alleged that the branch
manager's verbal conduct constituted sexual harassment. 2 The
court noted that sexual harassment is not actionable in and of it-
self in Virginia and that a claim of sexual harassment under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act is not available to workers who are not
"employees."8 As a consequence, the alleged conduct, no matter
how offensive, was not actionable in its own right under Virginia
or federal law. 4 Accordingly, the court held that the plaintiff
failed to state a claim of negligent retention.85
V. CLAIMS OF WRONGFUL DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY86
Virginia, like many states, has traditionally adhered to the
principle of employment-at-will.87 The Supreme Court of Virginia
has explained that:
Virginia strongly adheres to the common law employment-at-will
doctrine. We have repeatedly stated: "Virginia adheres to the com-
mon law rule that when the intended duration of a contract for the
rendition of services cannot be determined by fair inference from the
terms of the contract, then either party is ordinarily at liberty to
terminate the contract at will."
88
Thus, in Virginia, where no specific time period is fixed for the
duration of employment, there is a presumption that employment
80. Id.
81. Id. at *4.
82. Id.
83. Id. at *5.
84. Id.
85. Id. at *6.
86. For a comprehensive overview of the evolution of wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy claims, see generally Thomas M. Winn, III, Annual Survey of Virginia
Law: Employment Law, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 965 (1999); Thomas R. Bagby & Thomas M.
Winn, III, Connor v. National Pest Control Association: The Death Knell for Public Policy
Discriminatory Discharge Claims?, 11 J. CIv. LITIG. 149 (1999); Thomas M. Winn, III, The
Supreme Court Opens the Back Door for Public Policy Discriminatory Discharge Claims,
12 J. Civ. LITIG. 1 (2000).
87. See Hoffman Specialty Co. v. Pelouze, 158 Va. 586, 594, 164 S.E. 397, 399 (1932).
88. Lawrence Chrysler Plymouth v. Brooks, 251 Va. 94, 96-97, 465 S.E.2d 806, 808
(1996) (quoting Lockhart v. Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 247 Va. 98, 102, 439 S.E.2d
328, 330 (1994)).
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is at-will, terminable at any time by either party for any reason,
with or without cause. 9 The employment-at-will doctrine ordinar-
ily precludes terminated at-will employees from asserting com-
mon law causes of action for wrongful discharge or wrongful ter-
mination of employment. 90
In the seminal case of Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville,9 the
Supreme Court of Virginia for the first time recognized a "narrow
exception" to the employment-at-will doctrine.92 The exception al-
lows at-will employees to state a claim for wrongful discharge if
they can identify a public policy that was violated by the termina-
tion of their employment." In the fifteen years since this impor-
tant decision, plaintiffs have continued their assault on the at-
will doctrine through creative pleading and extensive scouring of
the Virginia Code for statutes expressive of Virginia's "public pol-
icy." While last year lacked the judicial fireworks of the past sev-
eral years, several notable opinions were issued.
In Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,9" the court held that the
employee could not rely upon Virginia Code section 18.2-5915 be-
cause the employee did not allege sufficient facts to establish that
the actions of the defendants satisfied the statutory prerequisites
of the cited code section.96
In Fisher v. A.W. Temple, Inc.,9" instead of filing a claim that
might have been barred by the exclusivity provision of the Vir-
ginia Human Rights Act,98 the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a
claim of racial harassment by alleging the torts of assault and
battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress.99
89. See id.
90. Id.
91. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985).
92. Id. at 540, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
93. Id. at 539, 331 S.E.2d at 801.
94. 52 Va. Cir. 480 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Spotsylvania County).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-59 (Repl. Vol. 1996 & Cum. Supp. 2001) (prohibiting extor-
tion).
96. Brown, 52 Va. Cir. at 483.
97. No. LL-870, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 193 (Cir. Ct. Aug. 4, 2000) (Richmond City).
98. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-3900A to -3902 (Repl. Vol. 2001).
99. Fisher, 2000 Va. Cir. LEXIS 193, at *12.
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VI. WORKERS' COMPENSATION EXCLUSIVITY
Under the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act,1 °0 an employee
is limited to remedies for all "injuries" arising out of and in the
course of the employment as defined under the Act.'' The Act
provides that "the rights and remedies herein granted to an em-
ployee.., shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such em-
ployee.., at common law or otherwise."0 2 The Act is highly re-
medial and must be liberally construed in favor of coverage.' 3
Thus, when the plaintiff incurs an injury in the course of his em-
ployment, he ordinarily has no right to pursue a common law ac-
tion. '4 The test is not whether plaintiff actually received Work-
ers' Compensation benefits,0 5 but rather whether the plaintiffs
claim falls within the Act. 10 6
In Combs v. Virginia Electric and Power Co., 07 an employee
developed a severe headache while participating in an aerobics
class at her employer's health center and thereafter was left un-
attended in the facility's "quiet room." 08 She later fell into a coma
and subsequently was diagnosed as having suffered a hemor-
rhage as a result of an aneurysm.0 9 The employee sued her em-
ployer alleging negligence."0 The employer responded with a spe-
cial plea claiming the employee's exclusive remedies for such
harm fell under the Workers' Compensation Act."' The court
granted the plea and dismissed the claim." 2 The Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed the dismissal, holding that the employee had
suffered an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
100. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-100 to -1310 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
101. Id. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
102. Id. § 65.2-307 (Cum. Supp. 2001).
103. See Henderson v. Cent. Tel. Co., 233 Va. 377, 382, 355 S.E.2d 596, 599 (1987).
104. Kimmell v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 993 F.2d 410, 412-13 (4th Cir. 1993); see also
Plummer v. Landmark Communications, Inc., 235 Va. 78, 84, 366 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1988);
Permison v. Vastera, 51 Va. Cir. 409 (Cir. Ct. 2000) (Loudoun County).
105. Kimmel, 993 F.2d at 412-13.
106. Plummer, 235 Va. at 84, 366 S.E.2d at 75; Braxton v. City of Richmond, 4 Va. Cir.
369, 370 (Cir. Ct. 1986) (Richmond City).
107. 259 Va. 503, 525 S.E.2d 278 (2000).
108. Id. at 506, 525 S.E.2d at 280.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 507, 525 S.E.2d at 281.
112. Id.
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employment.""' The court noted that the employee's injury was
not the aneurysm per se, but rather the "aggravation, exacerba-
tion, and/or acceleration of the aneurysm," which resulted "from
the alleged negligent emergency medical care or lack thereof that
she received from [her employer] and its [Employee Health Ser-
vices] employees after she suffered a severe headache during the
aerobics class.""4
VII. EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
In Judson v. America Online, Inc.,"5 former employees sought
a declaration of whether they were entitled to a pro rata share of
stock options under Non-Qualified Stock Option Agreements,
which had not vested as of the date of termination of employ-
ment." 6 The court held that the plain terms of the agreements
precluded any argument that the employees had a right to pur-
chase options that were not vested as of the date of termination
and, accordingly, granted the employer's Motion to Strike and
dismissed the case with prejudice." 7
VIII. CONCLUSION
Clearly, employment and labor law in Virginia was affected by
several important decisions over the past year. While the past
year lacked sensational decisions involving the public policy ex-
ception to the employment-at-will doctrine, a steady stream of
such claims in the lower courts likely will fuel further decisions
by the Supreme Court of Virginia. On the other hand, evolving
case law regarding the enforcement of noncompetition agree-
ments underscores the necessity of drafting covenants not to
compete that are not overly broad in geographic scope and/or du-
ration, are not unduly burdensome to the employee and their
ability to earn a livelihood, and are rationally related to the em-
113. Id. at 512, 525 S.E.2d at 283 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Repl. Vol. 1995 &
Cum. Supp. 2001)).
114. Id. at 508, 525 S.E.2d at 281.
115. No. 19242, 2000 WL 710298 (Va. Cir. Ct. May 22, 2000) (Loudoun County).
116. Id. at *.
117. Id.
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ployer's interests. Even in the absence of enforceable noncompeti-
tion agreements, employees must walk the fine line between
merely preparing to compete with an employer and breaching the
fiduciary duty of loyalty owed to the employer.
Moreover, plaintiffs continue to follow a national trend in pur-
suing claims against employers under common law negligence
theories. The past year's decisions provide fodder for future litiga-
tion against employers both vicariously through the doctrine of
respondeat superior and directly through negligent hiring and re-
tention claims. These decisions have further fleshed out the stan-
dards for such claims and provide guidance for practitioners in-
volved in litigating these theories.
